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A good defensive strategy against evolving cyber threats and cybercrimes is to raise 
awareness and use that awareness to prepare technical mitigation and human defense 
strategies. A prime way to do this is through training. While there are already many 
sectors employing this strategy (e.g., space, smart buildings, business IT), the 
maritime sector has yet to take advantage of the available cyber-range technology to 
assess cyber risks and create appropriate training to meet those risks. Cyber security 
training can come in 2 forms; the first is so security professionals can raise their 
awareness on the latest and most urgent issues and increase defense skill levels, and 
the second form is directed at non-security professionals (e.g., ship builders, crew) 
and the general public, who are just as affected by cyber threats, but may not have the 
necessary security background to deal with the issues. Conducting training programs 
for both requires dedicated computing infrastructure to simulate and execute effective 
scenarios for both sets of trainees. To this end, a cyber range (CR) provides an 
environment for just that. The purpose of this paper is to use studies on the concept of 
cyber ranges to provide evidence for why the maritime sector should embrace this 
technology for maritime-cyber training, and envision how they will provide maritime 
risk assessment and raise awareness to combat tomorrow’s threats. 
 
 All rights reserved 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Industries across the world are steadily increasing the integration of technology into their 
daily operations. The maritime sector, in particular, is embracing new, unique, innovations to 
improve efficiency and meet opposing demands for just-in-time goods and environmentally friendly 
travel. Trends of recent security incidences worldwide are showing that, not only is there an 
increase in the complexity and severity of cyber security threats, there has been a shift from 
traditional IT (information technology) attacks to infrastructure, which often use both IT and OT 
(operational technology). Some examples of cyber-attacks on recent infrastructure have affected 
pipelines (BBC, 2020), centrifuges (Langer, 2011), and even power grids (Lee et al., 2016). Based 
on the types of systems affected, both IT and OT, it is not unlikely that maritime infrastructure, 
particularly ports, can be accidently affected or intentionally targeted as well. Unintentional 
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malware infections have already illustrated the potential disasters, as shown by the Maersk incident 
(Maersk, 2017), which cost the company at least 200 - 300 M USD. 
Training to raise awareness is the first line of defense against cyber and cyber-physical 
threats, as well as future threats. It trains and helps the public, mariners, and security professionals 
to be, at least, prepared for and aware of high priority risks and the corresponding mitigation 
strategies. Using maritime-cyber training programs to train both mariners and security professionals 
often requires cyber security enabled labs and realistic simulation-based exercises. Generally, this 
article defines an exercise as using a cyber-security simulation, a sequence of attack and/or defense 
events, to train trainee participants to have better defensive understanding and mitigation skills 
against the simulated threats. It is important to note that training participants can be both human and 
non-human, as artificially intelligent agents could also learn and participate in defense strategies. 
The similarities and differences of these will be discussed further on. Please also note that this paper 
uses the phrase pilot scenario for a training and awareness activity for IT specialists, mariners, and 
technical frameworks. Previous studies and iterations of security training exercises have shown that 
preparing such programs requires a lot of time and resources, with preparation often taking months 
(Vykopal et al., 2017). This can be a significant dedication of resources, especially when applied to 
large-scale skill gaps in the cyber sector (Furnell et al., 2017); therefore, the effectiveness of a 
training program is of high importance. 
To meet the demands for these types of facilities and training programs, the concept of a 
cyber range (CR) was born. While a cyber range is physically a series of connected machines, the 
de facto configuration for many computing environments, conceptually it is a tailored teaching suite 
with a series of repeatable exercises, monitoring tools, and more. Therefore, software simulation, 
and diverse training capabilities, are what has drawn so much attention to CRs, and what makes this 
environment easily customized for different needs. The goal of this paper is to (1) evaluate what has 
already been achieved to fill the gap in maritime-cyber CR-based training with similar practices and 
(2) discuss ways to improve CRs for maritime-cyber training for future purposes. More specifically, 
this paper will build on future CR directions presented in Yamin et al. (2019), focusing primarily on 
improving scalability, education, and what the paper defines as “federation”. As addressing an issue 
of this magnitude requires a reasonable amount of time and resources, this work is funded by 
Cyber-MAR, a European project (Cyber-MAR, 2020). Specifically, the research in this paper was 
to help meet one of the project objects to enhance the capabilities of cybersecurity professionals and 
raise awareness of cyber-risks through the use of next generation cyber range environments, and to 
develop and deploy a highly customizable cyber-risk simulation platform to cover training needs for 
both mariners and IT professionals. As of 2020, this project is still in the initial development stages, 
and the specifics of the final product are not set; therefore, this paper is, as previously stated, a more 
conceptual and generic analysis on how cyber ranges can be used in the maritime context based on 
previous work on cyber ranges and knowledge of the maritime sector. 
The rest of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, cyber ranges designed for other contexts 
(e.g., space) are shown to illustrate what elements could be successfully used in future maritime-
cyber training. This also discusses some of the trends and future needs, identified in previous 
papers, and how they may lead to better training tools. When appropriate, we shall discuss how 
Cyber-MAR intends to incorporate the improvements discussed to provide next generation CR-
based maritime-cyber training by the end of the project in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 will examine 
how these context-specific CRs can be used to improve maritime-based training and risk assessment 
for both mariners and security professionals in the sector. Section 6 will discuss future work 
generally, and also more specifically tied to Cyber-MAR’s objectives. This paper concludes with 
why the maritime sector would conceptually benefit from CR-based training and simulations, and a 
potential roadmap to raise awareness and improve cyber and cyber-physical safety using the 
training program and cyber ranges mentioned. For Cyber-MAR project details, please see the 
Acknowledgements. 
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Figure 1 Example information and operation technology (IT/OT) in an Internet-of-Things (IoT). 
 
 
2. Background 
 There have been several attempts to classify and structure past uses of cyber ranges and 
cyber range concepts because of the broad definition and wide number of uses, users, and contexts. 
One notable attempt was conducted by the Australian government in 2013 (Davis & Magrath, 
2013). However, this particular study has several drawbacks today. It was published prior to a 
considerable increase in cyber range development around 2017 - 2018 and, as a document intended 
for government audiences, it lacked somewhat in research development discussions. A more recent, 
and therefore more complete, survey of existing cyber range architecture, design, and use is Yamin 
et al., (2019). This article provides a comprehensive literature review on several aspects of CRs 
used globally. General recommendations for the future of CRs are also made in this paper, based on 
past trends. It is interesting to note that, as of late 2019 when this was published, no notable efforts 
had been made to use this technology in the maritime context. 
Similar to most research in cyber-security areas, much of the current body of research can be 
classified as IT focused research or OT systems. Operational Technology (OT) is a fairly new term 
to cover the growing number of SCADA, industrial control systems, and other systems that perform 
physical operations in addition to cyber. For CR-based training, Siaterlis & Masera (2009) reviewed 
ranges designed to address the more traditional IT topic of internet security. A large advantage of 
these studies is to simplify complex systems, like the extensive global internet, into smaller-scale 
scenarios that testbeds and cyber ranges of all sizes could deal with. While it is best to have a 
realistic training environment, scalability is also an issue, and discoveries in these more mature 
areas of research can greatly guide the development of more unusual IT/OT hybrid environments, 
or even a complex maritime Internet-of-Things (IoT) environment (Figure 1). 
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Figure 2 Example information and operation technology (IT/OT) in an Internet-of-Things (IoT). 
 
 
A survey of more specific SCADA focused testbeds can be found in Qassim et al., (2017). 
There are many other forms of OT systems but, much like the internet is a significant focus for IT, 
SCADA is a focus for much OT research. Unfortunately, IT and OT are considered in isolation, and 
this causes an issue, as many sectors, including the maritime sector, are seeing a convergence of the 
2 (Tam & Jones, 2019a). In particular, port infrastructure is becoming smarter and more 
interconnected with port IT, and both ship bridge and ship engineering are becoming more 
electronically connected. This changes the nature of potential cyber-attacks and outcomes and, 
therefore, simulation and training based on the maritime context require a newer hybrid approach. 
Elements of both IT and OT simulations may also be directly ported into a hybrid environment. 
One more aspect to cyber ranges that should be addressed is simulation versus emulation. 
For instance, most cyber ranges in the public domain can be categorized as either simulation- or 
emulation-based. There are significant advantages and disadvantages to both approaches, but in 
general, simulation tend to be valued for high scalability on a small number of servers. In 
comparison, while emulation is more expensive to implement, the simulations are often more 
realistic. More generic details between simulation and emulation can be found in other research 
(Chou et al., 2016). Additional observations on using simulation, emulation, or real systems for 
researching cyber security in the maritime sector can be found in Tam et al. (2019). Based on 
research of the 3 options, it seems real systems and environments are better for testing systems and 
finding attack vulnerabilities, while simulation and emulation are better for scalable, repeatable 
training programs. For this reason, hybrid simulation and real equipment in a cyber range was 
chosen as the base technology for Cyber-MAR’s human and framework training program. 
Summarizing several figures and tables from Yamin et al. (2019) into Figure 2, we hope to 
illustrate the rough distribution of CRs using real, simulation, hybrid, or real equipment over the 
last 18 years. This also shows the proportion of what those CRs were used for, training or research, 
in IT, OT, or IT/OT areas. What this does not show, however, is that most of the OT and IT/OT 
orientated CRs were created more recently, since 2014. 
In the recent past, cutting-edge cyber range technology, based on simulation, has been 
produced by NASA to provide training for people manning space stations (Bailey, 2019). The 
purpose of this was to provide cyberwarfare training and technology development. This simulation-
based CR provided NASA with an adaptable virtual environment that represented a typical NASA 
mission system environment. This setup successfully enabled the training of network defenders and 
the ability to perform simulated red vs blue training in a space station. While this is pioneering CRs 
for cyberwarfare in space, Cyber-MAR will be developing equally cutting-edge abilities in the 
maritime sector, primarily at port, but considering ships as well. Another state-of-the art simulation-
based solution for studying industrial control systems (ICS) can be found in Giuliano & Formicola 
(2019). This focused on raising cybersecurity awareness amongst ICS maintenance staff. Similarly, 
Cyber-MAR aims to raise awareness in the maritime sector. Just as this research aims to address the 
lack of cost-effective CRs for the industrial domain, so does Cyber-MAR for the maritime sector. It 
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is important to note that, although there are commonalities between maritime and space, as well as 
between maritime and ICS, maritime will need its own unique CR configurations and capabilities, 
just as space stations and ICS require different CRs. 
When considering cyber-physical systems, usually including several OT components, in the 
last 2 years there has been new research in both emulation (Brownie et al., 2018) and simulation 
(Kavallieratos et al., 2019). Like in maritime and other transportation sectors (Tam & Jones, 
2019b), cyber-physical systems are becoming more popular and a potential risk for cyber and 
cyber-physical safety. Therefore, the security risk assessment of cyber-physical systems is 
becoming more and more important. As maritime operations are critical to modern society, with   
95 % of world trade depending on the sector (ICS, 2018), it is paramount that cyber ranges in this 
niche evolve more quickly to meet cyber needs. 
 
3. Cyber ranges and simulation testbeds  
The concept of simulating cyber-attacks for research existed before the cyber range concept; 
one of the earliest papers being Cohen (1999). Despite the age of this study, much of the research 
content is still relevant, and still applies to current cyber ranges, which are physical testbeds of 
networked system nodes designed to optimize user experience and teaching capabilities with these 
simulation and monitoring tools. That said, improving the architecture and tools of a cyber ranges is 
still a work in progress, especially when applied to new areas, such as maritime-cyber training. In 
this paper, and the Cyber-MAR project, the aim is to push the state-of-the-art in 3 directions, the 
maritime context, scalability, and federation, as discussed in the following subsection. 
 
3.1 Maritime context 
To achieve the levels of realism necessary to facilitate meaningful training, it is easier to use 
real equipment, as stated in Section 2. However, this is costly, and hinders both scalability and 
deployability; therefore, simulation and emulation often provide enough realism, as well as 
scalability and deployability (i.e., how easy it is to share the training in other areas to other 
audiences). A hybrid approach with simulation and real data is what Cyber-MAR is using to ensure 
the project pilot scenarios have the correct degree of real maritime context information. More 
generally, for the maritime context to be accurately virtualized, several layers of abstraction are 
likely to need simulating or emulating. This means the simulation needs to consider both digital and 
physical layers in the maritime sector. In Figure 3, we show 3 simplified layers for ports and ships, 
the main components of the maritime transport sector. Operational technology (OT) tends to exist 
on the physical layers, including cranes, propulsion, and energy, while IT tends to be placed on 
higher layers, primarily centered around network packets and operational data. Viewing these layers 
and understanding how they affect each other has been used previously to simulate and research 
complex environments, such as smart grids in a city (Park et al., 2019). 
In Figure 3, the physical layer of the network and energy grids affect the digital layer when 
it comes to monitoring. Events occurring in communications and logistics will affect the loading 
and unloading of cargo. Simulating multiple layers for 1 environment can increase overhead and 
requires a more powerful testbed. One example of SCADA testbeds being designed to be more 
scalable can be round in Alves et al. (2018); however, that would only be one element of one layer 
needed to represent a port. For a realistic scenario, not all elements need to be simulated, but Figure 
3 shows several elements that will likely be needed for a simulated maritime environment. Of 
course, training can limit the number of elements simulated by focusing on a port or ship 
specifically, or specifically on SCADA networks, as previous studies have done. However, to better 
understand the overall risks, multiple elements across multiple layers should be simulated and used 
for research and training purposes. To mitigate the cost of upgrading testbed hardware, scalability is 
a significant aspect of developing a cyber range. 
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The maritime sector has a growing need to use CR technology to assess cyber-risks and 
create appropriate training to meet the risks security people and non-security professionals (e.g., 
ship builders, crew) face. Conducting effective training in the maritime context is unique and 
essential due to the unique systems themselves and how they are used at port and at sea. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Maritime virtual and physical components for ships and ports categorized into layers. 
 
 
3.2 Scalability 
Often realism, which requires a lot of details, and scalability clash, as it is difficult to scale 
an exercise as the complexity increases. However, in order to train enough trainees fast enough to 
counter cyber and cyber-physical risks, CRs need to be scalable to meet demands. More 
specifically, to achieve the best results from a training exercise, the run time environment mimics 
the real world as much as possible. As seen with previous small scale and classroom oriented 
testbeds, this is easily feasible, as scaling the testbed hardware will provide realistic scenarios 
without noticeable lag. Replay in these smaller environments is also easier, making it easier to train 
multiple cohorts in a smaller time span. However, as an environment becomes complex, often out of 
a necessity for more realism, this becomes more difficult. This could be a challenge for cyber-
physical training, as it could require several layers of abstraction, as demonstrated in Section 3.1 
and Figure 3. Given this, a testbed designed to mimic a maritime context will likely require several 
layers of physical, IT, and OT networks in order to achieve high levels of realism. 
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Scalability is a common issue when facing real-world use, and there have been several 
papers researching ways to increase the scalability of cyber ranges in order to improve their 
usability as efficient training and research tools. Recent examples of new virtualization and 
emulation techniques being used to increase the scalability of cyber ranges can be found in Beuran 
et al. (2018), Ficco and Palmieri (2019), Pham et al. (2016). However, increasing the number of 
virtualized and emulated tools will still continue to add computing burden on the existing hardware 
and, eventually, the limitations of the physical cyber range or testbed will be reached. This is 
especially true if simulations are intended to become immersive for the trainees, increasing 3D 
graphics, the number of actors/players, realistic sensor inputs, and other environment simulations. 
Minimal infrastructure overhead will also ensure that CRs do not significantly impact the monitor 
software that collects and analyses trainee performance and simulation data (Hwang & Bush, 2015). 
A part of scalability is the quantity of data generated and used during a scenario. 
As it is may be overly resource taxing for individual sites to continue upgrading their testbed 
hardware, another option is to begin connecting cyber ranges in order to pool computing resources, 
and also share simulation, monitoring, and training capabilities. This is the approach Cyber-MAR is 
attempting, connecting cyber ranges in different physical locations using VPNs in order to improve 
scalability and support a higher level of realism. The 3 scenarios of this project will include a 
mixture of manual and human-generated input, much like most training scenarios. In most 
scenarios, and in the case of Cyber-MAR, not all data will be generated by human interaction and, 
in fact, data generators will be used to increase realism and improve the program’s capability for 
repeating exercises in a scalable way. Table 1 shows different types of data that can be seen in a 
cyber range and, more importantly, how scalable they may be. While “scalability” refers to how 
scalable the scenarios (i.e., data gathering, generating, monitoring, and processing) are, storage also 
affects scalability because of the limitations (e.g., memory, processing) of the physical testbed. 
 
 
Table 1 Types of data found in a cyber range during a simulation-based training program, and how 
realistic, scalable, and storage intensive they each are. 
 
 Realism Scalability Storage 
Stubs: Data to meet minimum requirements, often 
fixed replies to allow other services to function 
Low High Low 
Fuzzing: Data simulate all types of input for a system, 
but do not apply logic on applying inputs 
Medium Medium Low 
Simulation: The more realistic data is, the lower 
scalability tends to be, because it is challenging to 
accurately simulate many components together  
High Low Low 
Replay: Data can be replayed after being captured 
from human use, real devices, or other simulations. 
These are fixed event sequences 
High Low High 
 
 
3.3 Federation 
Lastly, we wish to discuss a method to improve launching realistic training exercise 
scalability within range to specifically address cyber-security in the maritime context, which is, as 
explained, unique. One term for this is federation, which was mentioned in papers like Yamin et al. 
(2019), Hwang and Bush (2015) to share activities, explore portable aspects, and compose cyber 
range capabilities on demand by connecting ranges. These aspects of cyber ranges and testbeds 
have not been addressed as much as scalability; however, they are becoming more sought after. 
Examples of federation include support for running simulations and actives (i.e., training, research) 
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over multiple locations. The connection of multiple physical testbeds in several areas for one, 
connected cyber range could aid in both scalability and federation. Cyber-MAR aims to connect 3 
physical testbeds, one of which is also portable. Therefore, while the portable component may lack 
the computing power itself required for high levels of realism, when federated to other larger, but 
stationary, testbeds, it is conceptually possible to achieve all 3 desirable traits mentioned in this 
article. Apart from the hardware aspect of a cyber range, individually or a connected collection of 
them, another way to ensure a training program is easy to share and deploy is to develop standard 
pilot scenario descriptions and definitions (Edgar & Rice, 2017). As a complex environment to 
simulate and train a range of users in maritime-cyber security, CRs for maritime training may 
require federation to achieve scalability and realism. 
As mentioned earlier, a federated cyber range can be implemented in a number of ways. 
This could include 1) an entirely simulation-based setup, 2) a purely emulated set-up, 3) a pure real-
life system setup, or 4) some combination of all of the above process imitation methods. A complex 
environment, such as a port, is often made up of a large number of sub-systems, and the choice of 
process imitation method that best suits a particular sub-system depends on a wide variety of 
factors, including the nature of the sub-system and the sub-system behaviors that are of highest 
interest. If the cyber range needs to be highly scalable, then simulated components often need to 
make up a large share of the final cyber range, as discussed in Section 3.2. 
A simulator can run in simulated time, whilst emulators are often restricted to running in 
real time. This can be a significant factor to consider, because some system behaviors of interest 
might manifest over long periods of time, and they therefore might need to resort to using simulated 
time in order to investigate the system effects caused by these system behaviors and/or events. 
Others might need to sync with other systems. A key example of this is the investigation of the 
propagation of worms in a computer, worms in a computer network, and associated effects. A worm 
might propagate through a large enterprise network very slowly, and so using simulated time is 
often necessary in order to make the experiment practical. This can be done by, for instance, 
simulating the network in a discrete event network simulator, such as ns-3 (NS-3, 2020). 
In other cases, it may be more appropriate for a more realistic model based on the emulation 
of networked computing devices. This can help identify system effects which could be very difficult 
to investigate in a purely simulation-based environment, such as vulnerabilities which are due to 
flaws in the implementation of security protocols as opposed to vulnerabilities inherent in the 
security protocols themselves. Due to the fact that a maritime port is made up of many different 
autonomous or semi-autonomous systems devoted to a wide variety of tasks, different cyber effects 
would be of interest, depending on the system in question and the nature of the cyber effects one 
wishes to investigate. This dictates whether simulation, emulation, or real testing is most 
appropriate, and why a federated cyber range, one made up of many largely autonomous 
subsystems, would be appropriate for investigating a complex system like ports and complex ships. 
 
4. Training 
This section will discuss context-specific cyber ranges that can be used to improve 
maritime-based training for both mariners and security professionals in the sector. While the 
underlying simulations and emulations may be very similar at a technical level, to make sure the 
training programs are effective for professionals of both maritime and security backgrounds, the 
amount of exposure to the details of the scenario may be different. Referring back to Figure 3, 
different levels of abstraction may be more relevant for training mariners, and IT specialists may 
require more detail of internet levels, both internal and internal, for monitoring and detection, in 
order to maximize learning. Issues on realism, particularly around bespoke protocols, and 
scalability have been discussed previously, and affect how accurate and usable training exercises 
are. However, the trainee learning and education aspects are achieved differently (Bertram, 2020b; 
Subasu et al., 2017; Caliskan et al., 2017). In addition, the type of data used during a training 
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scenario should ideally be simulated. While some stub data can be used (Table 1), only using stub 
data would lack realism. Fuzzed and replay data will also not be ideal since this will ignore live 
input from the trainee. It is critical for training simulators to react to trainee actions and input, and 
this will be implemented in the cyber range outputs of the Cyber-MAR project. 
In Tam and Jones (2019a) a survey on cyber-security was conducted to understand the risks 
and the type of training individuals have had. Roughly 32 % of the responses were seafarers, 19 % 
were higher management and IT security managers, and the remainder were classified as ship 
owners, manufacturers, students, and others. In this survey, participants named the standards of 
training as the biggest problem in the maritime industry (74.6 %), with cybercrimes and cyber-
attacks the second biggest issues (55.2 %). In addition, 60.7 % said they had not received any 
cyber-security related training, but that they believed maritime-specific cyber-security training 
would be useful for their daily tasks (75 %). This is ranked higher than generic IT cyber-security 
training. Conducting training programs for both security specialists and mariners requires dedicated 
computing infrastructure to simulate, potentially with multiple layers (Figure 3), and execute 
effective scenarios for all sets of trainees. To this end, a cyber range provides an environment for 
just this. Furthermore, federating multiple physical testbeds to form one cyber range with extra 
capabilities would increase training scalability and realism. While the cyber range technology will 
support the training scenarios (e.g., environment, storyline, actors, monitors), the training program 
must also be supported by scoring and management capabilities to facilitate learning during 
exercises. 
Facilitating learning can be used to enhance problem solving skills (John, 1989; Pham et al., 
2016; Vykopal et al., 2017). To help teach, scoring mechanisms and other ways of measuring 
performance are often used to help trainees learn. This has been used for student training in 
technology and simulation-based mariner training (Chiou et al., 2009; Marine Board, 1996). More 
recently, and applied to cyber security training in cyber ranges, studies like Huang et al. (2015) 
have begun developing specific scoring mechanisms. More generally, to help facilitate learning for 
security experts and mariners in the new developing area of maritime-cyber training, training and 
scoring mechanisms can be classified by the method used, and the tools used. 
1) Cyber range training methods can be classified by whether the performance scoring is 
based on achieving specific objectives or by analyzing logs generated as the scenario is played out. 
One example of a maritime-cyber specific objective, or flag, may be successfully executing an 
operation, like a change in course, despite cyber-interference. This would be more beneficial in CR-
based cyber-physical training (Tam & Jones, 2018), whereas more cyber-security orientated 
training may benefit more from evaluating logs (e.g., system, network, intrusion 
detection/prevention) to judge performance. 
2) Apart from method, training tools can be classified as software- or hardware-based. 
These tools are what are actually required for the exercise trainers to view flags (i.e., flag type, 
success, fail), log analyzers, and anything else required for the scenario. This relates back to virtual, 
emulated, or real hardware additions to a CR. For maritime-cyber training, this is highly dependent 
on the training scenario, and requires future research and trials. 
 
5. Maritime-cyber IDS and risk assessment  
It is important to note that “training” can be applied to more than human trainee participants, 
as artificially intelligent agents can also learn cyber defense and mitigation strategies. Data obtained 
from monitoring the scenarios played can be used to improve models for other simulations. In 
Cohen (1999), the approach used various simulations, or pilot scenarios, that were modelled using 
attacker and defender skills as key parameters. Attackers were classified extensively and based on 
real attackers, making simulation more comprehensible and increasing training efficiency. Models 
such as these can help automate or speed-up analysis and detection. This is becoming more 
important, as the number of cyber threats grow as skill shortages continue (Furnell et al., 2017). 
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While scenarios are run in a CR for trainees, monitoring data can also be fed into machine learning 
algorithms and other types of intrusion detection and risk assessment tools. For example, Cohen 
(1999) simulated cyber-attacks and defenses and produced data such as duration of the attack, if 
successful, and the outcome. With machine learning, this data can be used to train systems for better 
mitigation, recovery, and general awareness of the issues (e.g., risk assessment). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 CR for training security and mariner trainees and IDS/IPS/Risk assessment tools. 
 
 
Intrusion detection systems and intrusion prevention systems (IDS/IPS) in a cyber range can 
be used to monitor a network of systems for malicious activity or violations of policy. The 
definition of “malicious” is determined by the security architect and the training data used. As 
shown in Haider et al. (2017), using CR technology can greatly increase the amount of useful data 
that can be used to improve realistic IDS/IPS systems. Therefore, collecting data that is generated 
during a number of training scenarios can increase realistic IDS/IPS and realistic maritime-cyber 
risk assessment (Figure 4). Like with IDS, the downside with many risk assessment models is they 
struggle with the lack of realistic data. Papers like Cohen (1999) have raised concerns that that 
many attack simulation models are rarely validated against real world scenarios and data. In Svilicic 
et al. (2019), quantitative cyber risk analysis was done with a crew interview and a computational 
vulnerability scanning of a ship’s Electronic Chart Display and Information System, one of several 
bridge systems, but one often critical to ship operations. Furthermore, this study was validated with 
real world data from a university training ship, making it a valuable piece of work. Alternatively, 
the framework MaCRA is a dynamic risk assessment framework for multiple maritime systems, 
across ship and port, designed specifically for maritime-cyber issues (Tam & Jones, 2019a) and, 
while it has used some real data, it would greatly benefit from data extracted from cyber range 
training exercises. Not only will there be more system-level and human reaction statistics that can 
be used to increase the validity of cyber-risk assessments, the repeatability of the experiments will 
allow for higher confidence. Part of the real world data validation will also be provided with CERTs 
and CSIRTs, by engaging with at least 2 CERT/CSIRT teams. There are Cyber-MAR partners that 
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are CERTs and, at a later stage, additional teams will be invited to get involved in training 
simulations and risk analyses. 
 
6. Future work 
It is clear from maritime technology trends that cyber security is a growing risk in the 
industry (Bertram, 2020a). Systems in ports and on ships are becoming more complicated, 
integrated, and even automated, although to different degrees. Training the industry and developing 
new technical solutions to improve cyber security and awareness of the issues are critical going 
forward. In this paper, we identified one potential solution, using cyber ranges to train security 
specialists, mariners, and systems. This is to help raise awareness, increase risk mitigation, and 
improve strategies for threat detection, prevention, and recovery. However, the use of cyber ranges 
for these types of problems have only recently begun to be applied seriously, with the highest time 
of activity being the last ten years (2010 - 2020) (Yamin et al., 2019). As highlighted by many 
studies, the realism and scalability of cyber range solutions still have room for improvement. While 
some studies have focused on improving certain cyber range capabilities (see Section 3), others 
have explored using the technology for specific problems. This includes, but is not limited to, 
cyberwarfare and cyberwarfare in space stations (Hwang & Bush, 2015; Bailey, 2019). In a similar 
fashion, this paper has explored the potential uses of cyber ranges for the maritime sector. However, 
there are several areas of future research to be explored, some of which are currently being 
researched by the European project Cyber-MAR, details in the Acknowledgements. In this paper, 
we classify the areas of future cyber range development to address maritime-cyber issues into 4 
categories; 1) enhancing physical testbed capability, 2) introducing and improving the realism of the 
pilot scenarios played in the CR, 3) effective training for both security experts and mariners, and 4) 
data for increasing the realism of IDS/IPS and risk assessment frameworks. 
 
6.1 Testbed hardware and components 
There are 2 areas of future work on the physical cyber range testbed that we wish to discuss. 
Firstly, CRs can be connected to increase processing power, particularly if the cyber-range will be 
simulation or emulation intensive (Yamin et al., 2019). However, on the flipside, this will increase 
bandwidth and security issues, such as confidentiality. Therefore, any new bandwidth or 
cybersecurity issues will need to be addressed concurrently. Secondly, creating a physical and 
simulation hybrid CR by introducing real systems into the range can dramatically increase the 
realism, but may cause issues in repeatability (Tam et al., 2019). The benefit of either of these 
methods would be to improve the capabilities of the cyber range. This primarily increases realism 
but could also increase teaching and monitoring capabilities. In the maritime sector, this is 
particularly important, as one scenario could either require a complex environment to replicate or 
require several levels of details (Figures 3 - 4) in order to train different trainees. In particular, it is 
important to consider the training needs for mariners, security professionals, those at sea, and those 
at port. If the maritime sector begins to use cyber ranges to raise awareness and train people in 
maritime-cyber mitigation strategies, this will likely push the state-of-the-art for testbeds, cyber 
ranges, and cyber-physical scenarios (simulation, emulation, hybrid). Development of the physical 
CR is important in determining the advancements discussed in 6.2 and 6.3 as well. 
 
6.2 Improving scenario simulation and training 
Another area for improving the state-of-the-art to be more appropriate for training maritime 
cyber security would be to improve the simulation as well as the teaching methods. This is an 
important area for future research, as the teaching needs of security IT and mariners operating on 
ships or at ports differ. It is important to research if one, detailed, multi-layered scenario (Figure 3 
and Table 1) is better than two tailored scenarios for security professionals and mariners, 
particularly if the two groups see different parts of a larger cyber incident, or as maritime and 
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traditional security issues continue to converge. As the area of maritime-cyber continues to evolve, 
and as cyber range solutions evolve as well, there are many possibilities in this area. Specific to the 
mariner aspect, it would be interesting to see if it possible to incorporate maritime-cyber CR-based 
training into simulation-based navigation training, which most navigators undergo anyway for other 
training. This area of research could benefit from, and assist in, other transportation-based research 
for air, rail, and car, as well as industrial control systems. Depending on the layers simulated or 
emulated, there may also be parallels between smart grids or cities and other infrastructure. 
As training material is produced and trialed, the project will ensure that IMO training 
regulations, guidelines, and practices such as IMO (2017 and IMO (2013) will be complied. An 
exhaustive list is outside of the scope of this paper, as by the time the project has progressed to 
providing and evaluating training, regulations may have been changed or amended. This is possible 
as maritime cyber policy evolves, seen in similar, relevant, provisions in the International Safety 
Management Code (IMO, 2013). This includes training guidance for roles under ISM code and risk 
management. Cyber-MAR training will be designed to increase awareness through practical and re-
playable exercises for the trainees, but also for viewers and readers of the outputs of the exercises. 
The next section describes more methods to increase awareness of risks with cyber ranges. 
 
6.3 Improving realism of IDS/IPS and risk assessment 
Lastly, aside from human trainees, we discuss how the outputs of a cyber range training 
pilot or simulation can be used to improve cyber-security related software. For example, the outputs 
of cyber-attack and defense simulations include the duration of the attack and the eventual outcome 
(Cohen, 1999). This data can be fed into other models. In the Cyber-MAR project, the outputs of 
the cyber-risk models (e.g., MaCRA) are then considered inputs for an econometric model to then 
calculate the risk in terms of potential economic loss. While MaCRA was initially designed to 
provide more detailed outcomes beyond “win”/”lose”, future work within Cyber-MAR is also 
estimating the duration of the attack and the effects of the attack. Project partners will use this data 
to calculate the econometric outcomes. This is often a missing element in risk assessment, and it is 
difficult to discuss cyber-risks with larger organization without underlining the financial risks and 
concerns. Data taken from the training experience, particularly pilots that have been repeated many 
times with a range of trainees, will provide some much needed statistics in this area, as well as feed 
machine learning algorithms designed for defense and protection mechanisms. This can include 
network or host-based intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms (Ring et al., 2019). Future 
research in this area will provide useful cyber security intrusion detection and prevention tools that 
are maritime sector appropriate and designed to aid the personnel within the sector at different 
levels (mariner, ship builder, security manager, etc.). Ideally, these can be integrated with existing 
equipment to detect and prevent cyber intruders. Some alterations may be required, but the basic 
IDS/IPS rulesets may also be used at ports and on ships. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we discussed how and why the maritime sector would conceptually benefit 
from cyber range-based training and simulations. Just as other sectors have embraced CR solutions, 
if applied to the maritime sector, a potential roadmap could be provided to raise awareness and 
improve cyber and cyber-physical safety using the training methods and technical solutions 
mentioned. If implemented correctly, and with some future advancements in research, cyber ranges 
could provide good defensive strategies against evolving cyber threats and cybercrimes. In 
particular, this paper discussed using CR solutions to raise awareness and use that awareness to 
prepare technical- and human-based mitigation and defense strategies. While there are already 
many sectors employing this strategy, the maritime sector has yet to take advantage of the available 
cyber-range technology to assess cyber-risks and create appropriate training to meet those risks. As 
discussed, cyber security training appropriate for this sector can come in two forms; 1) security 
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professionals who can raise their awareness on the latest and most urgent issues and increase 
defense skill levels, and 2) non-security professionals (e.g., ship builders, crew) and the general 
public, who are just as affected by cyber threats but may not have the necessary security 
background to deal with the issues. We have discussed why conducting training programs in CRs 
requires dedicated computing infrastructure to simulate and execute effective scenarios for both sets 
of trainees. Although some future research is needed to ensure that the CR hardware, architecture, 
training capabilities, and outputs are beneficial, we conclude that the concepts associated with CR 
maritime security solutions could have significant, positive, effects on maritime-cyber security and 
are worth exploring fully. As the project progresses, trainee feedback will be collected after CR 
training exercises, and surveys will be conducted with experts to determine the exact effectiveness 
of methods. 
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